Part 3
Ethiopia’s Recognition to Somaliland: De facto or De jure?
Since its unilateral declaration of independence on 18 May 1991; Somaliland did not manage to attain an international recognition from any country or inter-governmental organization, including the neighboring states. In this regard, no country has showed interest that involved de facto recognition with the exception of Ethiopia. The regional governments strongly advocated and supported united Somalia, particularly, the Arab countries, such as Djibouti and Sudan which are members both of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the League of the Arab States.
As it was observed from the previous discussion, although Somaliland did not acquire an international recognition from the international community, one can argue that Ethiopia offered de facto recognition to Somaliland. Ethiopia has been in a dilemma to de jure recognize Somaliland. In this regard, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi echoed that the recognition of Somaliland as a separate and independent state from the rest of Somalia remains in the hands of the Somalis by referring to the chaotic situation of Somalia and the challenges from ONLF which aspires for the Ogaden independence from the rest of Ethiopia. This is situation forced Ethiopia to work with Somaliland for its national interest. Regardless of these, Ethiopia did not take the first initiative as it affects its interest nationally and internationally if it recognizes Somaliland[i].
Interestingly, Ethiopian Prime Minister issued a decree from his office few years before persuading that all state-owned companies, such as Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation (ETC), and Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO), and so on so forth, to use their import activities through the port of Berbera. This is an indication of certain degree of recognition and implies Ethiopia’s inclination to recognize Somaliland indirectly. But, the major aspect of this decree was in essence to illustrate Ethiopia’s role and its willingness to support Somaliland in order to attain de jure recognition. Moreover, the issuance of this decree from the Office of the Prime Minister was intended to attract the attention of the international community to reconsider their stance towards Somaliland. In other words, when Ethiopia opted to get access to Berbera port; it implies the legitimacy of the accord between the two sides. This invited the private sector in Ethiopia to contact Somaliland officials and their counterparts to involve in conduct trade activities far beyond the transactions taking place in the eastern part of Ethiopia. In response to the call, for example Ethiopian Banks moved to the Ethiopian border close to Somaliland and established their branches in Togochale[ii].
Moreover, as one of Somaliland cabinet member indicated; in 2004, Somaliland delegation visited Ethiopia and met with the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi; and discussed Ethiopia’s role in the recognition of Somaliland as a separate state from the rest of Somalia. But, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi emphasized that Ethiopia faced many condemnations from different sides when they allowed Eritrea to separate from the rest of Ethiopia. In this regard, the Ethiopian Prime Minister mentioned that Ethiopia is not going to be the first state to recognize Somaliland, and Ethiopia is not ready to take another accusation concerning the issue of Somaliland.
In the same way, since the ruling elites both in Ethiopia and Somaliland are former rebel groups of the two countries, they lack experiences and knowledge among each other, because they had lived in Somalia and Ethiopia respectively as a dissident groups. In relation to this, one of the SNM senior officials argues that the current leaders of Ethiopia are mostly engaged in southern Somalia politics, emphasizing that they know more about the southern part of Somalia and Mogadishu than the north and Hargeisa. Therefore, he elaborates that if Mengistu Hailemariam is on power with assurance he would recognize Somaliland as an independent state from the rest of Somalia.
Given Ethiopia’s position as the seat of the African Union (AU) it could have helped to convince the other countries or the international community in general not to force Somaliland to go back to the failed union of the 1960 with Somalia. Moreover, as frequently reiterated by Ethiopian officials, it is not ready to be the first state gives de jure recognition to Somaliland. In other words, Ethiopia is trying to give mush respect for the feelings of the African states since it is the Headquarters of the African Union[iii]. Despite the consequences of the previous discussion, Ethiopia is also attempting to pay close attention to its domestic policy and dynamics due to the existence of article 39 in the Federal Constitution, which advocates the secession of Ethiopia’s regional states if they fulfilled preconditions of secession[iv].
Regardless of the above-mentioned argument, it is possible to argue that Ethiopia hesitated to offer Somaliland de jure recognition. It seems that it wanted to kill two birds with one stone, it wants to extend respect to both Somalia and Somaliland; since it shares border with Somalia[v]. However, this is a kind of loose and weak recognition; it is severely unbalanced and unjust[vi].
As far as the issue of recognition concerned those in charge of Somaliland refer the case of Eritrea as a typical example. Eritrea has a clear advantage over Somaliland with regards to international recognition. In May 1993, Eritrea translated de facto into de jure statehood. In this regard, Eritrea’s and to a lesser extent Somaliland’s claims to self-determination is grounded on a historic consciousness of oppression, surviving military annihilation perpetuated by indigenous systems of oppression. Unlike Biafra and Katanga, Eritrea and Somaliland also have stronger juridical claims: each had existed for eighty years or more as a distinct colonial territory (Adam, 1994: 35-6).
Ethio-Somaliland Relations: General Perception of the Citizens
As many Ethiopian individuals and business communities indicate, there is the existence of good and brotherly relations between the two neighboring countries[vii]. Similarly, the Ethiopian society that inhabits the border area when they cross the border to buy goods inside Somaliland feels like they are in their own country. These shows there are no problems between the two societies; there is no phobia and hate between the two communities. The Ethiopian Birr is circulating in the Somaliland business centers along the border areas, where the two countries are currently interacting as a single state. Because of these and many other attachments, some Ethiopian people argue that the people in Somaliland are different from other Somalis in regards to treating and interacting with the Ethiopian people[viii].
It worth to mention that the Somaliland society in Togochale are the prime customers of the Ethiopian Banks, where the business activities are mostly taking place along the Somaliland part of the border. With the existence of strong and growing relations between the two sides, it is important to mention that it is difficult to differentiate them as Ethiopians or Somalilanders, having two different nationalities. Nonetheless, it deserves to respect the relations between the two sides and to appreciate such relations between the two communities and countries and expressed their happiness to see these growing relations between the two sides get solid[ix].
Furthermore, as widely repeated by the Ethiopian communities living in the border town of Togochale; the relations are basically brotherly and amicable. Likewise, Somaliland communities also use the services of the Ethiopian Banks, and they have opened their own accounts. In addition, they argued that if the border businesses were closed, no one is going to remain there; and mentioned that it will be a disaster to the communities living that area[x]. On the other hand, the smuggling of the Ethiopian currency to and from Somaliland creates confusion and makes it difficult to control as they are interdependent for many things.
Similarly, the communities living around the border areas were allowed to use their vehicles, both in the territories of Somaliland and Ethiopia in peaceful manner. Ethiopian citizens indicate that they export Chat, Vegetables, Potatoes, Wheat, Onion and Coffee to Somaliland, and need to exchange and buy from Somaliland the goods and commodities they need[xi]. Therefore, the openness of the border between the two sides and the activities going on are showing how far the relations between the two societies has been deepening, and mostly they argued that if there is no mutual understanding and interest between the two sides the border would not be open[xii].
Currently, the Federal Democratic Government of Ethiopia is going to finish the construction of the asphalt road which will connect Jijiga- the Capital of the Somali Regional State- to the border town of Togochale. The Transit, Shipping and Forwarding agencies of Ethiopia are waiting until the road was completed. This will increase the trading activities between the two sides, and will create opportunities both the communities of the two sides.
On the other hand, the view of the Somaliland citizens towards Ethio-Somaliland relations is not different from the Ethiopian nationals’ expression towards the relations between the two sides. Somaliland citizens argue that Somaliland in general and as a business community in particular needs to satisfy and supply the demands of Ethiopia in general and the eastern Hararghe in particular, since landlocked Ethiopia with above 73 million population needs sea outlet. In addition, business communities in Hararghe preferred sea outlet near to their business bases; where Somaliland both as administration and as business communities are eager to take that opportunity and responsibility to welcome their neighbors[xiii]. In this regard, they argue that they legally interact with Ethiopia using Letter of Credit (LC) and they not excluded the existence of contraband and illegal business activities, but they indicated that it is not equivalent the legal business activities taking place between the two societies, rather they argued that it is a minor issue[xiv]. Therefore, the only chance which Somaliland business communities have is both the public and the private banks which are open in the Ethiopian part of the town. These banks intensified interactions between the two societies and introduced each other, at the same time tightened the security of the town[xv].
Moreover, Somalilanders argued that they depend upon their Ethiopian fellows both as a business aspect and as a security matter, since Somaliland authority is fragile economically and cannot afford to carry out activities as Ethiopian government do. Hence, the two societies have mutual interest and when it comes to the issue of security, Ethiopia and Somaliland have common enemy, such as terrorist groups[xvi].
In spite of the above-mentioned discussion, most Ethiopians in the heart of the country cannot distinguish Somaliland people from those who came from Puntland[xvii], Somalia and even the Somalis living in the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia. These could be attributed to the failure of the government officials to disseminate their views regarding Somaliland to the Ethiopian society at the grassroots’ level, and that remains the major problem which caused the lack of Ethiopian community to have sufficient knowledge towards Somaliland facts. However, there is no hate and phobia between the two communities, rather than the failure of the state actors and leaders to introduce their two communities to each other[xviii].
Ethio-Somaliland Relations: General Perception of the Citizens
As many Ethiopian individuals and business communities indicate, there is the existence of good and brotherly relations between the two neighboring countries[i]. Similarly, the Ethiopian society that inhabits the border area when they cross the border to buy goods inside Somaliland feels like they are in their own country. These shows there are no problems between the two societies; there is no phobia and hate between the two communities. The Ethiopian Birr is circulating in the Somaliland business centers along the border areas, where the two countries are currently interacting as a single state. Because of these and many other attachments, some Ethiopian people argue that the people in Somaliland are different from other Somalis in regards to treating and interacting with the Ethiopian people[ii].
It worth to mention that the Somaliland society in Togochale are the prime customers of the Ethiopian Banks, where the business activities are mostly taking place along the Somaliland part of the border. With the existence of strong and growing relations between the two sides, it is important to mention that it is difficult to differentiate them as Ethiopians or Somalilanders, having two different nationalities. Nonetheless, it deserves to respect the relations between the two sides and to appreciate such relations between the two communities and countries and expressed their happiness to see these growing relations between the two sides get solid[iii].
Furthermore, as widely repeated by the Ethiopian communities living in the border town of Togochale; the relations are basically brotherly and amicable. Likewise, Somaliland communities also use the services of the Ethiopian Banks, and they have opened their own accounts. In addition, they argued that if the border businesses were closed, no one is going to remain there; and mentioned that it will be a disaster to the communities living that area[iv]. On the other hand, the smuggling of the Ethiopian currency to and from Somaliland creates confusion and makes it difficult to control as they are interdependent for many things.
Similarly, the communities living around the border areas were allowed to use their vehicles, both in the territories of Somaliland and Ethiopia in peaceful manner. Ethiopian citizens indicate that they export Chat, Vegetables, Potatoes, Wheat, Onion and Coffee to Somaliland, and need to exchange and buy from Somaliland the goods and commodities they need[v]. Therefore, the openness of the border between the two sides and the activities going on are showing how far the relations between the two societies has been deepening, and mostly they argued that if there is no mutual understanding and interest between the two sides the border would not be open[vi].
Currently, the Federal Democratic Government of Ethiopia is going to finish the construction of the asphalt road which will connect Jijiga- the Capital of the Somali Regional State- to the border town of Togochale. The Transit, Shipping and Forwarding agencies of Ethiopia are waiting until the road was completed. This will increase the trading activities between the two sides, and will create opportunities both the communities of the two sides.
On the other hand, the view of the Somaliland citizens towards Ethio-Somaliland relations is not different from the Ethiopian nationals’ expression towards the relations between the two sides. Somaliland citizens argue that Somaliland in general and as a business community in particular needs to satisfy and supply the demands of Ethiopia in general and the eastern Hararghe in particular, since landlocked Ethiopia with above 73 million population needs sea outlet. In addition, business communities in Hararghe preferred sea outlet near to their business bases; where Somaliland both as administration and as business communities are eager to take that opportunity and responsibility to welcome their neighbors[vii]. In this regard, they argue that they legally interact with Ethiopia using Letter of Credit (LC) and they not excluded the existence of contraband and illegal business activities, but they indicated that it is not equivalent the legal business activities taking place between the two societies, rather they argued that it is a minor issue[viii]. Therefore, the only chance which Somaliland business communities have is both the public and the private banks which are open in the Ethiopian part of the town. These banks intensified interactions between the two societies and introduced each other, at the same time tightened the security of the town[ix].
Moreover, Somalilanders argued that they depend upon their Ethiopian fellows both as a business aspect and as a security matter, since Somaliland authority is fragile economically and cannot afford to carry out activities as Ethiopian government do. Hence, the two societies have mutual interest and when it comes to the issue of security, Ethiopia and Somaliland have common enemy, such as terrorist groups[x].
In spite of the above-mentioned discussion, most Ethiopians in the heart of the country cannot distinguish Somaliland people from those who came from Puntland[xi], Somalia and even the Somalis living in the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia. These could be attributed to the failure of the government officials to disseminate their views regarding Somaliland to the Ethiopian society at the grassroots’ level, and that remains the major problem which caused the lack of Ethiopian community to have sufficient knowledge towards Somaliland facts. However, there is no hate and phobia between the two communities, rather than the failure of the state actors and leaders to introduce their two communities to each other[xii].
Part Two: Ethio-Somaliland Relations Pre-1991
The most important factor which determines Ethio-Somaliland relations is the strategic location where Somaliland situated. Furthermore, there were no political relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland. In this regard Somaliland was part and parcel of the Somali state, before an armed clan-based militias managed to overthrow the long-time ruler General Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991. In the same manner, Somaliland’s location in the northern part of the Somali state made it subject to the successive conflicts erupted between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1964 and 1977-1978[i]. Contrary to this, the political vendetta and antagonism between the two governments of Ethiopia and Somalia did not have an effect on the Ethiopians and Somaliland societies; however, as one of Somaliland former ministers argues that even while the two communities were overseas, both Ethiopians and Somaliland people were friends with the existence of the political vendetta between the two regimes[ii].
On the other hand, although Somaliland was not separate from the rest of Somalia before 1991, due to the existence of the geographic proximity, there were both people-to-people and Muslim-to-Muslim (faith) relationships. Hence, the major factor that serves as a bandage between the two communities as indicated earlier is the Somali Region of Ethiopia which connects the remote heartland of Ethiopia to the Somaliland cities. It deserves to mention century’s long trading system between the two neighboring communities, such as trade transactions between the cities of Berbera on one hand, Dire Dawe, Harar, Jijiga and Wardher on the other. Moreover, the emergence of the armed movements against the Barre regime; particularly, the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), diminished the hostility between the two nations, and downgraded the Somalia’s irredentism and its claims to the eastern part of Ethiopia inhabited Somalis[iii]. Furthermore, the Somali National Movement (SNM) managed to break up the political hostility, suspicion and the standoff between Ethiopia and the Somaliland people by breaking the shield of the conflict[iv].
Even though Ethiopia served as the base of the Somali National Movement (SNM), there were no political or state-to-state relations between the two sides before the emergence of the armed movements. Moreover, it was proxy relations since the armed movements were getting sanctuary from the Ethiopian government. The only durable relation which this movement restored and created is the people-to-people relationship and communication. This laid down the foundation for future relations both before the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 and afterwards[v]. On the other hand, since Somaliland is strategically close to the strategically sensitive places of Ethiopia such as Dire Dawe, Harar and Jijiga, both Ethiopia and Somaliland are vulnerable to any conflict which could erupt and destabilize the whole region. Therefore, Ethiopia is prone any conflict from the northern Somalia (Somaliland) than the southern Somalia, since the later is too far from the strategically sensitive locations of Ethiopia[vi].
Ethio-Somaliland Relations from 1991-1993
As soon as the clan-based armed movements managed to remove from power the long-time ruler of Somalia, General Mohamed Siad Barre, Somalia which was the makeup of British and Italian colonies united to form the “Greater Somalia” disintegrated into regions, and heavily armed warlords emerged in mainland Somalia. Somaliland which was British Protectorate proclaimed its independence from the rest of Somalia, claiming the colonial boundaries inherited from the British government in 1960. Furthermore, Somaliland adopted a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the neighboring states. In addition, Ethiopia de facto recognized the peace and stability in Somaliland as a stable region compared to the hostility going on its neighboring southern part of Somalia. Ethiopia pursued a policy which maintains that if the conflict in the southern part of Somalia continued it may affect the relative peace and stability of Somaliland[vii].
In the same way, when the people of Somaliland defeated the autocratic rule of Mogadishu, the current ruling coalition of Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) also managed to overthrow the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. This means the dissident groups both in Ethiopia and Somalia succeeded to defeat the two Socialist-oriented regimes in the Horn of Africa[viii]. Subsequently, when the Somali National Movement (SNM) managed to end the rule of Barre, and declared the independence of Somaliland from the remaining part of Somalia, the Somali National Movement (SNM) Chairman Abdirahman Ahmed Ali was inaugurated as the first President of Somaliland. Nevertheless, from 1991 to the end of 1992, there were no official relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland, because there was civil war which was going on in Somaliland. That civil war was the major challenge which obstructed the foundation of official relations between the two neighboring countries[ix]. Therefore, although Ethiopia and Somaliland maintained close relations in different sectors; these relations started officially after the formation of the second administration of Somaliland led by Mohamed Ibrahim Egal in 1993. Since then, Ethiopia strategically regards Somaliland as its closest ally in the Horn of Africa[x].
Ethio-Somaliland Relations from 1993-2002
Somalia’s state collapse caused the dismantling of the state institutions throughout the country. At this stage it is important to note that, Somaliland was the region which spearheaded the Somalia’s state collapse and its disintegration. After it separated from the rest of Somalia, Somaliland established its own institutions, by putting aside and ignoring the prolonged state collapse in the south. Therefore, after the cessation of the civil hostility which erupted in Somaliland post-1991; Ethiopia and Somaliland started to establish their relations[xi].
In May 1993, when the late Mohamed Ibrahim Egal came to power, relations between the two sides started to take shape. The activities carried by Egal were the founding-stone which created the current bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland. This move also made the military commanders of the Ethiopian armed forces in Hararghe[xii] to contact their counterparts of Somaliland to collaborate in order to maintain peace and stability along the border areas between the two sides. But, relations were weak and ineffective at that time, since Somaliland was emerging from the ashes of prolonged civil conflict.
Since the beginning of the 1998, the relations between the armed forces became strong, particularly, the Central Command of the two armed forces, backing by the civilian officials of the two governments. This shift also accelerated the people of the two to interact and exchange visits across the borders. The confidence created by the two armed forces, led the Ethiopian government to trust Somaliland and regard it as an ally and friend in a volatile region. As an expression of the good relationships, the Ethiopian government invited President Egal several times to visit Ethiopia, where Ethiopia’s State Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tekede Alemu (Dr) paid several visits to Hargeisa[xiii].
It worth to mention that once President Egal was elected in the Borama Conference in 1993, Egal administration changed the political balance and took political risks by eliminating the political antagonism and the legacy of the two military regimes which created suspicion between Ethiopia and Somalia in general and Somaliland in particular. Moreover, the relations between the two sides reached its peak[xiv].
Ethio-Somaliland Relations from 2002-Present
After one decade of the establishment of Somaliland in the Grand Conference in Buroa, and one year after the Constitution was approved in a public referendum, it managed democratically transfer power to the Vice-President, as the President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal passed away in South Africa in May 2002. The new interim President promised to continue and pursue the policy of his predecessor. Similarly, it deserves to mention that Egal’s domestic, regional and international policy is the core philosophy of the interim President. Regardless of minor differences between the two successive governments of Somaliland, regarding their positions to the neighboring Djibouti, the two leaders maintained similar policy in their relations with Ethiopia, by acknowledging Ethiopia’s role both at the regional and international levels. Ethiopia and Somaliland have experienced dynamic relationships, and Somaliland regards Ethiopia as one of its closest friend and ally in the Horn of Africa[xv].
In this regard, it deserves to mention that when Somaliland failed to resolve their internal problems related to the successive postponements of the presidential election that led to the eruption of bloody riots in Hargeisa in the late of 2009, Ethiopia also supported by the international community, particularly British government, was the first state which came to help Somaliland by bringing together the contending ideas of the political parties using shuttle diplomacy that eventually ended the standoff between the government on one hand and the political parties on the other[xvi].
Ethiopia’s Relations with Somaliland: Political or Economic?
Due to globalization and the current international system it is difficult to separate the politics from economics and vice-versa. It appears that each of these two factors is complementing one another. The growing relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland initially originated from political relations which later involved economic elements. Politics is the key for people-to-people relationships and no one can dare to invest in the economy of another country without understanding the political situation of that country[i].
Since the mid of the twentieth century, there were economic transactions and trading system between the two societies of Ethiopia and Somaliland[ii]. But, the political antagonism between the successive governments in Ethiopia and Somalia derailed those transactions by blocking the cross-border activities of the two neighboring societies. When Somaliland declared its independence from the rest of Somalia, both Ethiopia and Somaliland opted to create political relations. In this regard, economic relationships have been evolving following the use of the port of Berbera by Ethiopia and Ethiopian Airlines launched its direct and official daily flight to Hargeisa in 2001. Ethiopian businessmen have been coming to Somaliland to buy different commodities[iii].
Following these developments, Ethiopia and Somaliland exchanged low-level diplomatic relations; Ethiopia opened a trade office which serves as a Consulate in Hargeisa, where Somaliland established its liaison office in Addis Ababa. Therefore, Ethiopia offered to Somaliland various kinds of assistance such as military trainings and scholarships both to military officers and students who finished their secondary education. It deserves to mention that Somaliland officials have regular contacts to their counterparts in Ethiopia and the intelligence agents of the two sides also have close cooperation[iv].
With the existence of the political hostility between Ethiopia and its neighbor Eritrea and non-feasibility of its ports, and the Djibouti port which cannot handle the magnitude of Ethiopia’s imports and exports; as well as the increasing charge of the Djibouti port, Ethiopia opted to seek other sea outlets. In this regard, it realized the importance of the port of Berbera, if the port and the road connecting to Ethiopia were upgraded. The study to further utilize the port of Berbera is still going on. It deserves to mention both the economic and political relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland is growing and encouraging, where the economic transactions between the two countries amounts millions of dollars per annum, such as Chat, and other commodities which Somaliland imports from Ethiopia including Wheat, Onion, Potatoes, and Livestock as well[v]. It is also important to mention that Ethiopia is trying to block the goods coming from the border of Somaliland and getting into Ethiopian territory, by regarding these goods and commodities illegal and contraband. This is the major challenge which is against the trading activities and need to remove it, in order to encourage the business transactions occurring between the two countries[vi].
With the lack of international recognition to Somaliland, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) is working with the Somaliland Central Bank. Hence, the growing relations between the two sides are better than previous relations between Ethiopia and Somalia[vii].
Coming Soon Part 4
Ethio-Somaliland Relations Post-1991: Challenges and Opportunities
Author: Nasir M.Ali
Part One -
Table of Contents
Dedication
Methodology
Abstract
Background
Ethio-Somaliland Relations Pre-1991
Ethio-Somaliland Relations from 1991-1993
Ethio-Somaliland Relations from 1993-2002
Ethio-Somaliland Relations from 2002-Present
Ethiopia’s Relations with Somaliland: Political or Economic?
Ethiopia’s Recognition to Somaliland: De facto or De jure?
Ethio-Somaliland Relations: General Perception of the Citizens
Challenges and Obstacles to the Relationships
Future prospects of Ethio-Somaliland Relations
Conclusion
References
Dedication
I would like to acknowledge those who have helped me at every step along the way from the tentative conception of the paper to its completion. To the friends whose suggestions were invaluable and without their generous advice and assistance the paper could not reach the standard.
Methodology
The finding of this study is primarily originated from four week research mission to Somaliland late 2009 and early 2010. The study is concerning the growing relations between Ethiopia and the Republic of Somaliland with particular emphasis Post-1991. The study interviewed people, including political figures, academicians, retired military officials, member of parliamentarians, ambassadors, journalists and business communities both in Ethiopia and Somaliland. The bulk of this research was carried out in the capital Addis Ababa, Hargeisa and Togochale. However, this study is not going beyond indicating the relations between the two countries and critically highlights the challenges and opportunities of these relations. Similarly, it optimistically tries to understand the mutual concern of these relations.
Abstract
It deserves to mention the two neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa, namely Ethiopia and Somalia were having distressed relations. The two were using tit-for-tat policy against one another by hosting the dissident groups of their respective states. Eventually, these rebellion groups managed to overthrow the long-time rulers of the two neighboring states. The history of Ethio-Somalia relations is marred by distrust, hostility and war. Suspicion and political fanaticism is deeply rooted in their relation. Consequently, when the Somali state collapsed and the country disintegrated, the situation has changed. Ethiopia established both diplomatic and economic relations with Somaliland which declared its separation from the rest of Somalia and became closest bilateral partner, while it remains the only country that maintains a significant diplomatic presence in Hargeisa- a trade office which effectively serves as a Consulate. Ethiopia is one of Somaliland’s most important trading partner and Ethiopian Airlines flights between the two capital cities Addis Ababa and Hargeisa serve as one of Somaliland’s primary physical links with the outside world before it suspended its flights. This may be understandable since the trade office of Ethiopia was one of the main targets destroyed by the terrorist suicide bombs, including the Presidential Palace and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) office in Hargeisa on 29 October 2008. The attack also led to 28 persons to perish. With the exception of this terrorist act, the two countries normally have friendly ties, with landlocked Ethiopia providing trade and security assistance to Somaliland in return for using Somaliland’s port of Berbera.
Background
The uneasy relations between Ethiopia and Somalia basically emanate from claiming people and land in the adjacent area (irredentism), which led the two neighboring countries to go to bloodiest wars ever-witnessed in the Horn of Africa during the Cold War era. Although, the Haud, Reserve Area and surrounding areas are inhabited by Somalis, they were incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire during the ‘Scramble of Africa’, on the basis of treaties and agreements signed between Ethiopia and its European ‘neighbors’. This historically determined status quo has been rejected by the newly independent Somalia, which has made it a sacred obligation to struggle for the ‘decolonization’ of the whole region (Amare, 1989: 482-3). However, for over four decades, relations between successive Ethiopian governments and Somalia have not been smooth and easy. Principally, Ethio-Somali relations were full of mistrust and political hostility between the two regimes. Consequently, every regime was plotting against one another and hosted their respective dissident groups (tit-for-tat) such as, the Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and United Somali Congress (USC) sponsored by Ethiopia; while Somalia sponsored the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Eritrean Popular Liberation Forces/Front (EPLF). The major concerns of these two regimes were to weaken and ultimately destroy each others’ government respectively1.
The conflict in the Horn has involved swiftly changing series of cross-cutting alliances which has made the outcome uncertain. For example, at one time both the Soviet Union and Israel were on the Ethiopian side, giving considerable military aid. While the Soviet Union also maintained a military presence in Somalia during the early part of the confrontation, and the Saudis promised unlimited petro-dollar support if the Somali government would abandon its Socialist-oriented policy in favor of Islamic ones (Bereket, 1980: 129). However, historically Saudi involvement in Somali politics has been deep (Medhane, 2002: 171). In the same way, the strategic content of U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa must be seen in terms of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, predominantly Southern Africa, for two reasons: The first has to do with the position toward the struggle in the Horn adopted by the dominant Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the
1 Interview with one of the prominent senior figures both in Somalia and Somaliland Armed Forces, Hargeisa, on 4 January 2010
second with position expressed in the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) by the black African governments. U.S.-Arab cooperation in the Horn is determined by a mutual interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the Arabs’ long-term policy on oil (Bereket, 1980: 136). As for the African consideration, the African governments’ interest in preserving the postcolonial status quo puts them on the side of Ethiopia to Ethio-Somalia conflict, which Somalia viewed as an aggressor. However, the Soviet turned to Ethiopia’s side over the Ethio-Somali conflict stole the tactical political thunder from the United States of America (Ibid).
In the late-1970s, the Ethiopian government at that time gave support to two movements that began sporadic armed opposition to the Siad Barre dictatorship in Somalia. The first was the Somali National Movement (SNM) which operated in the northwest, in part of what had been British Somaliland, essentially among the Isaaq clan. The other movement to benefit from Ethiopian assistance was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which operated in the northeast, largely appealing to those clans, particularly Majerteen, of the Darod clan other than Siad’s own, the Marehan, which also saw themselves as marginalized (Lionel, 1999: 91). Ethiopia’s support to the above-mentioned two Somali rebellious groups, especially the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM), was to use against its enemy Siad Barre. Somalia retaliated by giving support to the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) - a guerrilla organization sponsored by the Somali government (Berouk, 2004: 18). In addition, the Barre government was also the major sponsor of other Ethiopian armed rebellious groups. The current ruling party of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) which is an umbrella of different parties such as Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) that took part the overthrow of the Derg regime, received assistance from Somali authorities and a number of the EPRDF leaders reportedly carried Somali-issued passports (Ted, 2009: 18). Other rebel groups, including the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), also received assistance from Somalia.
On the other hand, the down fall of the Siad Barre government and the absence of a central authority in Somalia ended support for Ethiopian armed groups. Although Somali factions continue to support the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Ethiopia’s major concern was preventing the growing influence of the Islamists in Somalia which it sees as potential threat to its security and that gets support
from particular Gulf States like Saudi Arabia. In the same way, Saudi Arabia was uneasy about the emergence of the EPRDF and EPLF which it saw as movement of leftist orientation. It was then seen as sympathetic toward the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO) which operated in eastern Ethiopia (Kinfe, 2004: 256).
As it was discussed above, following the collapse of the Somalia central authority in 1991; Somaliland which previously united with the Italian Somaliland in 1960, declared its independence from the rest of Somalia, claiming the boundaries which the British government handed over on 26 June 1960. Although unrecognized by any country or inter-governmental organization since its unilateral declaration of separation from Somalia, Ethiopia maintains close relations with that de facto Somaliland. Ethiopia became the first State that de facto recognized it by opting to send diplomatic mission to Somaliland and opened a trade office that serves as a Consulate in Hargeisa.
Coming Soon - Part Two
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